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Abstract— Certain crimes are hardly committed by individuals 
but carefully organised by group of associates and affiliates loosely 
connected to each other with a single or small group of individuals 
coordinating the overall actions. A common starting point in 
understanding the structural organisation of criminal groups is to 
identify the criminals and their associates. Situations arise in many 
criminal datasets where there is no direct connection among the 
criminals. In this paper, we investigate ties and community 
structure in crime data in order to understand the operations of 
both traditional and cyber criminals, as well as to predict the 
existence of organised criminal networks. Our contributions are 
twofold: we propose a bipartite network model for inferring 
hidden ties between actors who initiated an illegal interaction and 
objects affected by the interaction, we then validate the method in 
two case studies on pharmaceutical crime and underground forum 
data using standard network algorithms for structural and 
community analysis. The vertex level metrics and community 
analysis results obtained indicate the significance of our work in 
understanding the operations and structure of organised criminal 
networks which were not immediately obvious in the data. 
Identifying these groups and mapping their relationship to one 
another is essential in making more effective disruption strategies 
in the future. 
Keywords—network analysis, bipartite network; organised 
criminal network; underground forum 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The Internet and related technologies lend themselves 
perfectly to crime coordination across dispersed areas [1]. The 
least common denominator of organised crime is human 
relationships, social networking is inevitable among criminal 
groups responsible for the provision of illicit goods and services 
[2]. Despite the ongoing efforts by governments, law 
enforcement agencies, academic researchers, and the security 
sector, little is yet known about the preferred structures, 
longevity, and how trust is assured among criminal groups [1]. 
Available empirical data suggest that conventional and cyber 
criminals are more likely to be involved in loosely associated 
illicit networks rather than formal organisations [1] [3]. 
Organised criminal groups often involve multiple offenders 
connected through various relationships [4]. These relationship 
can be represented as a network where the nodes are the 
criminals while the edges are the criminal interactions. Social 
network analysis, defined as a theoretical and methodological 
paradigm for sophisticated examination of complex social 
structures in [2], has a long history of application to evidence 
mapping in both fraud and criminal conspiracy cases [5], it is 
useful in understanding the patterns of relationships among 
criminal groups and in identifying key members in the group 
[6]. Node centrality and network density measures in social 
network analysis are useful in identifying pivotal nodes and 
potential fraud hotspots, sub-structures, structural holes and 
clustering coefficient measures are used for network 
classification and path prediction [7]. Link analysis allows for 
mixing of different node and edge types in the same network 
and is useful in generating investigative leads and for 
uncovering missing information that may be hidden in a 
criminal network [4]. Groups, also called communities or 
clusters in a network, can be considered as fairly independent 
compartments with high concentrations of edges within groups 
of vertices and low concentrations between these groups in the 
network [8]. Group detection is a useful method for 
understanding the structure and organisation of criminals in a 
network.  
 Criminal intelligence process relies on the ability to 
obtain and use data. Three main sources of data identified in [9] 
include: open data such as newsletters, closed data in form of 
structured databases and classified data often collected through 
covert means. A common starting point in understanding 
criminal groups is to identify the criminal’s associates i.e. 
identifying relationships between individuals and their roles in 
the criminal activities [9]. These relationship are usually 
obtained from email and phone communication logs [10], 
underground forums [2] [11] [12] [13], scraped using set of 
seeds or leaked data [6] [14], money trails [15] [16], crime 
records [17], by extracting and associating entities in the grey 
literature [5] [18] or by combinations of these sources.  
 Situations may arise in a criminal dataset where there 
is no direct connection among the criminals, such is the case in 
[18] which involves the extraction of organisational structure of 
covert network from textual data obtained from public news, 
the archive of Evolution, an online black market in [13] that 
recently disappeared comprising of list of underground vendors 
with their associated products, and the crime report in [19] 
comprising of list of rogue manufacturers with their associated 
products. In order to address the issue of lack of direct 
connection among criminals and the need to understand their 
organisational structure, we propose the following research 
questions: (i) can we infer relationship based on common 
attributes and other metadata among entities involved in crime 
but not directly connected? (ii) is there an individual or groups 
directing the overall operations in a criminal network? We 
address these problems by (i) modelling a bipartite network in 
order to infer relationships between actors and resources 
involved in crime and (ii) analysing nodes and community 
structures of the resulting network.  
 This work is organised as follows: Section II provides 
a concise review of related work; Section III describes the 
research methodology; Section IV provides two case studies for 
evaluating our model and the final section describes 
conclusions and future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Criminal network data may contain variety of entities 
such as persons, organisations, locations, URL’s, vehicles, 
weapons, properties, bank accounts, etc. Learning associations 
between these entities is a critical part of uncovering criminal 
activities and fighting crimes [4]. Criminal groups show various 
levels of organisational structure. This organisation according 
to [1], depends on whether: (i) their activity is purely aimed at 
online targets such as swarms consisting of ephemeral clusters 
of individuals with no leadership as in the case of the 
Anonymous or hubs which are organised with a clear command 
structure and a focal point of core criminals around which 
peripheral associates gather as in the case of LulzSec, (ii) their 
activity uses online tools to enable conventional crimes such as 
clustered hybrids which are articulated around a small group of 
individuals and focused around specific activities or methods as 
in the case of carding networks or extended hybrids which are 
less centralised consisting of many associates and subgroups, 
and (iii) they combine online and offline targets such as 
hierarchies or aggregates according to their degree of cohesion 
and organisation. Social network analysis as a tool for 
understanding organised criminal groups involve the detection 
of structural changes in social networks with node and group 
level measures. The node level metrics include: degree and 
centrality measures while the group level metrics include: 
density, cohesion, group stability, etc. Group detection tasks in 
criminal network analysis involve detection of meaningful 
clusters of criminal actors, their interaction, the interaction of 
their subgroups and cliques in criminal data. Increased work in 
network analysis of criminal groups is reported recently in [2] 
[4] [5] [6] [10] [11] [12] [17] [18] [20] [21].  
Criminals utilise underground forums in form of 
chatrooms and private messaging services to exchange 
information on abusive tactics and engage in the sale of illegal 
goods and services [2] [11] [12] [13]. Anonymised carding 
forums’ private messaging records were modelled as graphs in 
[2] with the aim of uncovering the underlying structural and 
behavioural properties of cybercriminals, measures 
investigated include: degree distribution, assortativity, rich club 
phenomenon, transitivity and small world phenomena, 
connectivity and cohesive subgroups. Another analysis of 
underground forums aimed at understanding the social 
dynamics of six underground forums and how they impact e-
crime market efficiencies was carried out in [11]. A recent study 
of underground forum interaction in [12] which uses six 
different centrality measures to produce a visual representation 
of cybercrime forum reports that criminal groups are organised 
into two distinct communities that resemble (i) gangs, which are 
limited in size with one central leader who makes all the 
decisions for the group and (ii) mobs, with hundreds or 
thousands of members that share relatively equal centrality 
rankings divided into multiple sub-groups. Vulnerability in 
organised crime groups that can be exploited by law 
enforcement agencies include how group members earn trust 
among pears and the way they get their money or the e-currency 
they use [12]. Market basket analysis of products traded in 
Evolution, an online black market operating on Tor network 
that recently became extinct was carried out in [13]. Results 
obtained from these studies would allow authorities to better 
utilise their resources and devise more effective disruption 
strategies in the future. 
In [4], a link analysis technique that employs shortest 
path algorithms and priority first search to identify the strongest 
associations between entities in a criminal network was 
proposed and evaluated using Phoenix Police Department crime 
reports. The network of the 19 hijackers surrounding the tragic 
events of September 11th, 2001 were mapped through public 
data in [5], the result obtained revealed that the hijackers did 
not work alone but had accomplices who were on the planes, 
yet they were the conduits for money, skills and knowledge 
needed to execute the operation. Meta matrix model of concepts 
extracted from public news was used in [18] to detect and 
analyse the structure of a covert network. 
Analysis of the community structure of Nigerian 
scammers were carried out in [6] and [10]. The study in [6] 
shows that these scammers are organised into tightly and 
loosely connected groups while the findings in [10] revealed 
that only ten groups are responsible for about 50% of the scam 
attempts we receive. In [17], n-clique and k-core algorithms 
compared fairly well with other propriety criminal group 
detection models. An analysis of cybercriminal ecosystem on 
Twitter in [20] reports that while network criminal hubs are 
more inclined to follow criminal accounts, the criminal 
accounts tend to be socially connected, forming a small-world. 
Network analysis of South African arms deal and corruption 
carried out in [21] reveals that a single actor can have many 
separate relationships through which resources (information, 
money, influence, etc.) are shared with other actors. If this actor 
were to be removed, a large part of the network would be 
disconnected from the rest and significant resources would be 
unable to reach large parts of the network. 
 Procedures for implementing social network analysis 
for organised crime prevention were described in [6] [7] [9]. 
The central theme in [6] is focused on constructing large scale 
social graph from a smaller set of leaked data and linking of the 
leaked data (set of email addresses) to Facebook profiles to 
scrape large scale social graphs. The main focus in [7] is centred 
around fraud analytics and the laid down procedures include: 
(i) building the network, (ii) graph sampling to select set of 
flagged nodes, (iii) exploring, observing and measuring 
fundamental network metrics, and (iv) applying mitigation 
measures based on the inference from the measured metrics. 
The main focus in [9] is operational, the procedure include 
understanding client needs, obtaining and use of relevant data, 
data quality evaluation, data collation strategy, data integration 
and analysis, knowledge dissemination, and finally, re-
evaluation.   
 Although our approach also utilises social network 
measures for understanding criminal network grouping, its 
novelty can be traced to the use of bipartite network model, a 
special type of graph representation where vertices are divided 
into two sets 𝐴 and 𝐵, and only connections between two 
vertices in different sets are allowed [22]. The bipartite network 
representation naturally suits criminal datasets that may lack 
direct connection between criminals and allows for inferring of 
hidden ties among each of the two sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 as we can see 
in the next sections. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The research tasks are categorised as follows: (i) criminal 
network extraction, (ii) network representation, (iii) measuring 
network metrics, and (iv) analysis of group dynamics. 
A. Criminal Network Extraction 
 One of the main challenges of data extraction for 
network analysis lies in the choice of vertices, relationships, and 
attributes that can best answer the targeted research questions. 
Candidate choices for each of the three major network elements 
are: vertices (individuals, groups, organisations, bank accounts, 
products, URL’s, resources, affiliates, Internet infrastructures), 
edges (friendship, ownership, distributor/advertiser and can be 
binary, weighted, directed, undirected, multipartite or multiplex 
relationship) and attributes (location, time etc.).  
 Network elements extraction is straight forward in 
structured data such as police records where vertices have been 
structured in tables and the edges are derived either as binary or 
weighted relationship between single or multimode vertices. In 
a semi or unstructured data such as text documents, network 
constitute the union of all statements per text document, 
vertices are concepts or ideational kernels represented by one 
or more words, while edges are the links between two or more 
concepts [18]. In the latter case, data collection is more of an 
approximation via text or natural language network analysis.  
B. Network Representation: The Bipartite Network Model 
Let 𝐴 =  {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑖}, represent the vertex sets of actors 
such as individuals, group of individuals or organisations 
capable of initiating an action over certain resources and 𝐵 =
 {𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑖}, represent the vertex sets of resources such as 
products, then an actor is uniquely connected to resources and 
no connection exist between actors and actors or resources and 
resources. The set of edges or relationships 𝐸 ⊆ 𝐴 𝑋 𝐵, are the 
initiated actions while the edge weights represent the total co-
occurrences of similar instance of connections. The pairs 𝑎𝑥 , 𝑏𝑦 
denote an actor 𝑎𝑥, who is associated to a resources 𝑏𝑦. The sets 
𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐸 can be represented as a bipartite graph 𝐺 =  (𝐴 ∣
𝐵, 𝐸), where 𝐴 and 𝐵 are called the partite sets of the graph 
vertices that are connected by an edge iff (𝑎𝑥 , 𝑏𝑦 ) ∈ 𝐸, with 
1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑖 and 1 ≤ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑗 where 𝑖 is the number of unique actors 
and 𝑗 is the number of unique resources in the network. The 
cardinality or the number of edges in the bipartite graph is 
represented by 𝑛 = |𝐸|. The pairs 𝑎𝑥 , 𝑏𝑦 can also be represented 
as 𝑏𝑦 , 𝑎𝑥 denoting a resources 𝑏𝑦 associated by an actor 𝑎𝑥, 
hence the actor-resources network can be represented by a 
weighted undirected bipartite network 𝑴𝒊𝒙𝒋. In order to infer 
ties among actors in the network, we transform the bipartite 
network 𝑴𝒊𝒙𝒋 to its unipartite components 𝑨 and 𝑩 or actor-
actor and resource-resource network respectively. The 
unipartite networks are obtained in a process called bipartite 
projection described in [22]. The bipartite to unipartite 
transformation process is illustrated below. Fig.1. is an actor-
resource bipartite network representation where the two sets of 
vertices are differentiated by red (resources) and green (actors) 
colours. The unipartite components are obtained by selecting 
one of the sets of vertices and linking two vertices from that set 
if they were connected to the same vertices of the other sets. 
 
 
Fig.1. Actor-resource bipartite network 
 
The 𝐴-projection of our actor-resource bipartite 
network 𝐺 =  (𝐴 ∣ 𝐵, 𝐸), shown in Fig.2. is the actor-actor 
network 𝐺𝐴 =  (𝐴, 𝐸𝐴) in which two vertices of 𝐴 are linked 
together if they have at least one neighbour in common.  
 
 
Fig.2. Actor-actor unipartite network 
The 𝐵-projection of our actor-resource bipartite 
network 𝐺 =  (𝐴 ∣ 𝐵, 𝐸), shown in Fig.3. is the resources-
resources network 𝐺𝐵 =  (𝐵, 𝐸𝐵) in which two vertices of 𝐵 are 
linked together if they have at least one neighbour in common.  
 
 
Fig.3. Resource-resource unipartite network 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Network Metrics 
When trying to understand networks, we often want to identify 
important vertices, locate subgroups, or get a sense of how 
interconnected a network is compared to other networks. Vertex 
and edge specific measures include: degree, degree centrality, 
closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, eigenvalue 
centrality, PageRank and local clustering coefficient. Measures 
that can be used to describe the structure of the entire network 
include: density, degree distribution, connectivity and 
centralisation. 
If the actor-actor network matrix 𝑨 is defined by: 
 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 exists 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥 j 𝑡𝑜 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥 i
0 otherwise
 ,                 
 
then it follows from [6] that the degree of a vertex in the 
network defined as the number of edges connected to the vertex 
or the cardinality of the vertex neighborhood is given by: 
 
𝑑𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑗
                                                                                     (1) 
the degree centrality is defined as: 
 
𝐷𝑖 =
𝑑𝑖
𝑁 − 1
 =
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑗  
𝑁 − 1
                                                                  (2) 
 
where 𝑑𝑖 is the degree of the vertices and 𝑁 − 1 is a 
normalization factor (𝑁 is the number of vertices in the 
network) and 0 ≤  𝐷𝑖  ≤  1. Closeness centrality of a vertex, 
defined as the distance of a vertex from other vertices or the 
sum of shortest paths between a vertex and all other vertices in 
a network is given by: 
 
𝐶𝑖 = (𝐿𝑖)
−1 =
𝑁 − 1
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑗
                                                                    (3) 
 
where 𝑑𝑖𝑗  is the distance between vertices 𝑖 and 𝑗. 𝐿𝑖 is the 
normalized distance of a vertex from other vertices in a 
network. Betweenness centrality of a vertex, defined as the 
number of shortest paths in a network which passes through that 
vertex is given by: 
 
𝐵𝑖 =
∑
𝑛𝑗𝑘(𝑖)
𝑛𝑗𝑘𝑗<𝑘
(𝑁 − 1)(𝑁 − 2)
                                                                   (4) 
 
where 𝑛𝑗𝑘 is the number of shortest paths between 𝑗 and 𝑘 and 
𝑛𝑗𝑘 (𝑖) the number of such paths which pass through vertex 𝑖. 
(𝑁 −  1)(𝑁 −  2) is the normalization factor. Eigenvector 
centrality of a vertex determines to what extent a vertex is 
connected to other well-connected vertices and is given by: 
 
𝑥𝑖 =
1
𝜆
∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑗∈𝑀(𝑖)
=
1
𝜆
∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑥𝑗
𝑗
                                                     (5) 
 
where 𝑀(𝑖) is the set of neighbors of 𝑖 and 𝜆 is a constant. 
Clustering coefficient of a vertex is the probability that any two 
randomly chosen neighbours of that vertex in a network are 
connected themselves, hence a measure of the density of a 1.5-
degree egocentric network. Density of a network, defined as a 
measure of how many edges are in a given set compared to the 
maximum possible number of edges in the network is:  
 
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 2 ∗
|𝐸|
(|𝑉| ∗  (|𝑉| −  1))
                                            (6) 
 
By counting how many vertices have each degree, a degree 
distribution is formed. Degree distribution deg(d) is defined as 
the fraction of vertices in a graph with degree d. Connectivity, 
also known as cohesion, is a count of the minimum number of 
vertices that would have to be removed before a network 
becomes disconnected. Centralisation uses the distribution of a 
centrality measure to understand the network as a whole. Once 
a network has been constructed and measurements have been 
calculated, the resulting dataset can be used for many 
applications. 
D. Community Structure 
 A useful way to understand a large network is to 
analyse some sections or subgraphs of the network referred to 
as egocentric networks. Subgraph allow us to identify common 
social roles and structures. Community detection in networks is 
a typical clustering problem [8] [23]  and is aimed at identifying 
modules by using the information encoded in the network 
topology. Communities are assumed as groups of vertices that 
are similar to each other. This assumption allows for computing 
the similarity between each pair of the vertices with respect to 
some local or global reference property such that each vertex 
ends up in a cluster whose vertices are most similar to it, 
irrespective of whether they are connected by an edge or not 
[8]. It follows from [23], that in a network whose vertices can 
be assigned positions and embedded in an 𝑛 dimensional 
Euclidean space, the similarity or dissimilarity between the 
vertices can be computed using any norm 𝐿𝑚 such as: the 
Euclidean distance (L2-norm), Manhattan distance (L1-norm), 
or the L∞-norm. The concept of structural equivalence where 
similarity is inferred from the adjacency relationships between 
vertices is used for networks that cannot be embedded in space. 
Another important class of measures of vertex similarity is 
based on properties of random walks on graphs [8]. Such 
measure is the basis of the Walktrap algorithms in [23]. Another 
property of particular interest is whether or not all vertices in a 
group are connected to one another, when this happens, it is 
called a clique. A clique requires that all objects of a subgraph 
are connected to each other. A k-clique is a complete subset of 
size k of a graph [6].  
IV. EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
We conducted two case studies: one on traditional 
counterfeiting crime (rogue manufacturer-manufacturer 
network), and the other on cybercrime (Darknet vendor-vendor 
network) data, in order to evaluate how we can infer ties among 
criminals using bipartite network modelling.   
A. Rogue Manufacturer-Manufacturer Network 
Pharmaceutical crime involves the manufacture, trade 
and distribution of fake, stolen or illicit medicines and medical 
devices, it also constitute the counterfeiting and falsification of 
medical products, their packaging and the associated 
documentation as well as theft, fraud, illicit diversion, 
smuggling, trafficking, illegal trade of medical products and the 
money laundering associated with it [3].  
Pharmaceutical crime data may be composed of a 
variety of entities such as: people, organisations, brands, 
locations, storefronts, websites, bank accounts, and product 
delivery agencies [4]. These entities may form networks 
composed of: (i) thousands of storefronts in various locations 
(ii) affiliate websites run by associates’, (iii) many botnet 
spamming partners who are paid to advertise illicit online 
pharmacy networks, (iv) covert systems for processing online 
orders, and (v) regular mail or courier services distributors, 
thereby making it difficult to track at the same time allowing 
the key actors to evade detection for long periods of time [3] 
[4]. Once these criminal groups are identified and their habits 
known, law enforcement authorities may begin to assess current 
trends in crime in order to forecast and hamper the development 
of perceived future criminal activities [9]. 
 Network analysis of archived pharmaceutical crime 
data can be useful in modelling indirect relationships among 
important entities involved in pharmaceutical product 
counterfeiting. These entities can be criminals (manufacturers, 
advertisers, and distributors), the products they sell, banks that 
process their credit and debit card transactions or the delivery 
services used by these criminals. The method can also be used 
to reveal relationships between user accounts sending 
pharmaceutical spam and the spam URL’s. The case study tasks 
include: (i) data extraction, (ii) network representation, (iii) 
vertices and network level analysis and (iv) group analysis. 
1) Rogue Data Extraction 
Using the year of sampling criteria, we extracted all the data 
from the Medicines Quality Database (MQDB), a public and 
freely accessible online tool that tracks medicines tested for 
quality in selected countries in Africa, Latin America and 
south-eastern Asia [19]. Currently, the database contains about 
13,319 instances of medicines collected and tested from 12 
countries. We extracted subset of the records with confirmed 
counterfeiting incidents. We then filtered duplicate data and 
removed all rows containing Missing, Unknown and N/A 
records in the Manufacturers column. We considered the 
following variables most relevant for the task at hand: Year, 
Manufacturer, Product, Country, Province, Dosage, Date of 
Sample Collection, and Test Result. 
 
2) Rogue Network Representation  
We constructed an undirected, weighted bipartite network, 
shown in Fig.4. between manufacturers (red vertices) with fake 
incidences and their associated products (green vertices) and 
called it rogue manufacturer-product network. The edge weight 
represent the co-occurrence frequency of manufacturer-product 
instances. The assumption we made here is that all 
manufacturers with atleast one product counterfeiting are 
rogues.  
 
 
Fig.4. The rogue manufacturer-product network  
The unipartite manufacturer-manufacturer network that 
resulted from projecting the network in Fig.4. is shown in Fig.5.  
 
  
Fig.5. The rogue manufacturer-manufacturer network  
3) Rogue Manufacturer-Manufacturer Network Analysis 
We first report the aggregate metrics of the largest connected 
component of the network in Fig.5. These include: number of 
unique vertices = 9, number of unique edges = 19, geodesic 
distance (diameter) = 3, average geodesic distance = 1.4321, 
and network density = 0.5278. The vertex-specific network 
metrics for the larger component obtained by applying equation 
(1), equation (3), equation (4), and equation (5) for degree, 
betweenness, closeness and eigenvector centralities 
respectively are presented in TABLE I.  
 From the results in TABLE I, the important vertex in 
the rogue network is 1_CBF, it has the highest degree and 
centralities. A vertex with the most neighbours (degrees) can be 
said to be a key member with influence in its local 
neighborhood.  
 
 
 
TABLE I.  ROGUE NETWORK VERTEX-SPECIFIC METRICS 
 
Vertices Degree Betweenness Closeness 
 
Eigenvector 
1_FactoryThree 5 0 0.083 0.149 
1_ANB 5 0 0.083 0.149 
1_Shijiazhuang 5 0 0.083 0.149 
1_Remy 5 0 0.083 0.149 
1_CBF 7 15 0.111 0.163 
1_Acdhon 5 0 0.083 0.149 
1_GPO 2 0 0.071 0.040 
1_Brainy 3 7 0.077 0.041 
1_Tman 1 0 0.050 0.008 
 
4) Rogue Manufacturer-Manufacturer Network Group 
Analysis 
We extracted 1.5 degrees egocentric networks of each vertex 
and reported subgraphs with more than three edges in Fig. 6. 
The star topology of egocentric network of the vertex 1_CBF 
indicates its relative importance as a switch or hub in the rogue 
network. 
  
Fig.6. Subgraphs of the rogue network for the following vertices: (a) 1_Acdhon 
(b) 1_ANB (c) 1_CBF (d) 1_FactoryThree (e) 1_Remy (f) 1_Shijiazhuang 
 
We applied four different community detection algorithms: 
Girvan Newman, Clauset Newman Moore, Wakita Tsurumi and 
Walktrap described in [8] in order to study the natural clusters 
in the rogue network. TABLE II is the summary of the 
community detection results for communities with minimum of 
three vertices. The result for the Walktrap method is presented 
in Fig.7.  
 When working with massive crime data with location 
and time attributes, these grouping might signal an element of 
organisation among the criminals. These naturally occurring 
clusters are based on patterns of social ties rather than formal 
group memberships. Vertices with a central position in their 
clusters, i. e. sharing a large number of edges with the other 
group partners, may have an important function of control and 
stability within the group while vertices lying at the boundaries 
between modules may play an important role of mediation and 
lead the relationships and exchanges between different 
communities. 
TABLE II.  ROGUE NETWORK COMMUNITIES 
Vertices in 
each cluster 
Algorithms 
Girvan Newman Clauset Newman 
Moore 
Wakita Tsurumi 
 
 
Cluster 1 
1_FactoryThree 
1_ANB 
1_Shijiazhuang 
1_Remy 
1_CBF 
1_Acdhon 
1_FactoryThree 
1_ANB 
1_Shijiazhuang 
1_Remy 
 
1_Acdhon 
1_FactoryThree 
1_ANB 
1_Shijiazhuang 
1_Remy 
 
1_Acdhon 
 
 
Cluster 2 
1_GPO 
1_Brainy 
1_Tman 
1_GPO 
1_Brainy 
1_Tman 
1_CBF 
1_GPO 
1_Brainy 
1_Tman 
1_CBF 
 
Cluster 3 
1_China 
1_Guilin 
1_Medipharco 
1_China 
1_Guilin 
1_Medipharco 
1_China 
1_Guilin 
1_Medipharco 
 
It is interesting to note that most of these incidents were 
recorded in one country. 
 
 
Fig.7. Rogue network communities using Walktrap algorithm 
 
We further subject the rogue network to a more strict 
community detection methods so as to detect cliques. TABLE 
III is the clique community detection result. 
TABLE III.  NETWORK CLIQUE COMMUNITIES 
Communities Rogue Cliques 
3-clique community 21 
4-clique community 15 
5-clique community 6 
6-clique community 1 
 
There were a total of 43 clique communities starting from a 3-
clique community in the rogue network. The size of the largest 
clique community is 6 with a single clique. Clique communities 
     
       (a)                         (b)                      (c)    
 
      
         (d)                            (e)                        (f) 
 
     
 
in the rogue manufacturer-manufacturer network may lead to 
the detection of organised criminal network. 
B. Darknet Vendor-Vendor Network 
 The Internet is now a catalyst for illicit online 
pharmacies, marketing falsified medicines to the public. There 
are several online market places on the hidden part of the 
internet (Darknets) offering prescription medicines together 
with cannabis for sale to the public, these market places such as 
Silk Road, Agora and Evolution provide online access 
anonymity via anonymising software such as P2P or Tor and 
payment anonymity via crypto-currencies such as Bitcoin to 
criminals with shipments being sent across the world between 
source, transit and destination countries [24]. Large-scale 
abusive advertising is a profit-driven endeavor, abuse-
advertised goods and services such as spam-advertised Viagra, 
search-advertised counterfeit software and malware-advertised 
fake anti-virus have been dominated by an affiliate business 
model comprised of independent advertisers acting as free 
agents acquiring traffic via spam or search, and in turn paid on 
a commission basis by their sponsors who handle the back end, 
customer service and payment processing [15] [16]. Counterfeit 
pharmaceutical affiliate business models such as GlavMed, 
SpamIt and RX-Promotion involve a range of sponsors 
providing drugstore storefronts, drug fulfillment, shipping, 
payment processing, customer service and independent 
advertisers or affiliates who are paid a commission for 
promoting the program using botnets to send spam email or 
manipulating search engine results [15]. 
TABLE IV.  VENDOR-PRODUCT LISTING ON EVOLUTION DARKNET DATA 
Vendor Products 
MrHolland Cocaine, Cannabis, Stimulants, Hash 
Packstation24 Accounts, Benzos, IDs & Passports, SIM Cards, 
Fraud 
Spinifex Benzos, Cannabis, Cocaine, Stimulants, 
Prescription, Sildenafil Citrate 
OzVendor Software, Erotica, Dumps, E-Books, Fraud 
OzzyDealsDirect Cannabis, Seeds, MDMA, Weed 
TatyThai Accounts, Documents & Data, IDs & Passports, 
PayPal, CC & CVV 
PEA_King Mescaline, Stimulants, Meth, Psychedelics 
PROAMFETAMINE MDMA, Speed, Stimulants, Ecstasy, Pills 
ParrotFish Weight Loss, Stimulants, Prescription, Ecstasy 
Pharmacy_U Analgesics, Drugs 
 
1) Darknet Data Extraction 
We were opportune to have access to the archive of Evolution, 
an online black market operating on Tor network few weeks 
after it disappeared on March 18, 2015 via [13]. The extracted 
data consists of what product each vendor sells on different 
dates and contains few top-level categories such as Drugs, 
Digital Goods, Fraud Related, etc. which are subdivided into 
product-specific pages and each page contains several listings 
by various vendors as illustrated in TABLE IV.  We extracted 
all records for Analgesics category and obtained 5002 records 
with the variables “Vendor”, “Products”, and “Date”. 
2) Darknet Data Representation 
We constructed an undirected, weighted bipartite network, 
shown between vendors and their associated products and 
called it Darknet vendor-product network. The edge weight 
represent the co-occurrence frequency of vendor-product 
instances. We then transformed the network to its unipartite 
components, the vendor-vendor network obtained consists of 
102 vertices, 952 edges and 4 connected components as shown 
in Fig.7. 
 
 
Fig.7. Darknet vendor-vendor network 
 
3) Darknet Vendor-Vendor Network Analysis 
We first report the aggregate metrics of the largest connected 
component of the network in Fig.7. These include: number of 
unique vertices = 95, number of unique edges = 947, geodesic 
distance (diameter) = 6, average geodesic distance = 2.1682, 
and network density = 0.2121. The important vendor in the 
Darknet network is 1_TheNurseJoy, it has the highest degree 
and centralities. 
 
4) Darknet Vendor-Vendor Network Group Analysis 
We obtained four clusters each of vertices 35, 26, 24, and 10 
respectively when we applied Clauset Newman Moore 
community detection algorithms in [8]. There were however, 7 
and 24 communities found with Wakita Tsurumi and Girvan 
Newman algorithms respectively. The size of the largest 
clique community is 28 with a single clique. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Many types of crimes require a high degree of 
organisation and specialisation. Criminal networks show 
various levels of organisational structures, they may operate as: 
swarms, hubs, hierarchies, aggregates, or hybrids according to 
their activity, degree of cohesion and organisation. The 
organisation of crime may also occur in the darknet where 
individuals interact within online discussion forums and chat 
rooms. Identifying criminal groups within a network and 
mapping their relationship to one another can be essential to 
making intelligent strategic decisions. Social network analysis 
is being used to automatically identify criminal clusters that 
may not have been obvious in a crime dataset. These naturally 
 
occurring clusters are based on patterns of social ties rather than 
formal group memberships. Identifying these clusters and their 
boundaries allows for a classification of vertices according to 
their structural position in the groups. Vertices with a central 
position in their clusters may have an important function of 
control within the group while vertices lying at the boundaries 
between clusters may play an important role between different 
communities.  Situations often arise in a criminal dataset where 
we lack direct connection among criminals. In this work, we 
model such data as a bipartite network in order to infer 
relationships between actors and resources based on their 
common attributes. We evaluated the model using two case 
studies and the results were very significant and can reveal 
some hidden ties among criminals that were not immediately 
obvious in the data.  
 We plan to undergo further evaluation of the model in 
a large scale case study and in collaboration with law 
enforcement agents. Weighted projection of the bipartite graph 
will be considered in the future. 
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